Enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements using a deposit-refund system by McEvoy, Dave & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Archived version from NCDOCKS Institutional Repository http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/ 
 
McEvoy, David. (2013). Enforcing Compliance with International Environmental Agreements using a 
Deposit-Refund System. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 13(4): 
481-496. Published by Springer www.springer.com (ISSN: 1567-9764) DOI: 10.1007/s10784-013-9209-2 
 
 
Enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements 
using a deposit-refund system 
 
David M. McEvoy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Whether nations are able to cooperatively manage shared resources through 
international environmental agreements (IEAs) depends on whether compliance with 
voluntary commitments can be enforced. Given that nations are sovereign enforcing 
compliance with IEAs cannot rely on the presence of a strong sanctioning body. 
Nonetheless, enforcement provisions must be effective in the sense that they will deter 
noncompliance and credible in the sense that they will actually be imposed. In this 
paper, we address the problem of enforcing compliance with IEAs by examining one 
promising mechanism—a deposit-refund system—that exhibits the necessary features 
for effective enforcement. We analyze a simple model to demonstrate the desirable 
properties of the mechanism and then consider the effects of imperfect monitoring, 
uncertainty, partial participation and reputation on the effectiveness of a deposit-refund 
system. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Whether nations can collectively manage shared natural and environmental resources 
through international environmental agreements (IEAs) depends largely on whether 
they can enforce compliance with their commitments. The present challenge of 
thwarting global climate change highlights this point very clearly. The Kyoto Protocol, 
currently the only binding agreement restricting greenhouse gas emissions, has been 
largely unsuccessful in part because the signatories to the agreement have little 
incentive to meet their individual emissions targets (Barrett 2008). While enforcement 
mechanisms are imperative for meaningful international cooperation, the nature of 
voluntary negotiations among sovereign states rules out more traditional regulatory 
approaches (e.g., emissions abatement mandates). Rather, provisions for enforcement 
must be decided collectively and, because of sovereignty, enforcing compliance cannot 
rely on the presence of a strong sanctioning body. Furthermore, the enforcement 
provisions need to be effective in the sense that they will be severe enough to deter 
non-compliance and credible in the sense that they will actually be imposed. In this 
paper we, address the problem of enforcing compliance with IEAs by examining one 
promising mechanism—a deposit-refund system—that appears to exhibit the necessary 
features for effective enforcement. A general version of the deposit-refund mechanism 
explored here has recently been proposed in the theoretical economics literature 
(Gerber and Wichardt 2009), and the reported results are encouraging in terms of its 
effectiveness at facilitating international cooperation. This paper presents an economic 
critique of a similar deposit-refund system applied specifically to global-scale 
international environmental agreements. We analyze a simple model to demonstrate the 
desirable properties of the mechanism and then provide an economic critique of some 
practical concerns. 
 
While deposit-refund systems are implemented in a number of more simplistic settings 
(e.g., return of recyclable solid waste), we analyze a deposit-refund mechanism within 
an international environmental agreement. The basic mechanism is straightforward, and 
its most critical element is that parties are able to deposit funds in escrow within a 
neutral third-party financial institution. As a starting point, consider a negotiated treaty 
that has defined emissions abatement commitments for each party as well as a defined 
minimum number of countries required to ratify for entry into force.2 Once the treaty is 
open for ratification, parties must decide independently whether to join and become 
signatories to the IEA. As part of the ratification process, each member is required to 
pay an initial deposit to a neutral, third-party financial institution. The deposit amounts, 
like emission abatement commitments, are defined before the ratification period. The 
IEA enters into force if enough countries ratify (and pay deposits) to satisfy the minimum 
participation requirement. If the participation requirement is not satisfied, then all 
deposits are returned and no agreement enters into force. 
 
Following entry into force, IEA members then decide whether to comply with their 
commitments (i.e., they choose their emissions levels). When the compliance period 
(e.g., the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol) ends, abatement decisions 
are monitored and the third-party financial institution pays back the deposit if the 
member country is found in compliance.3 Otherwise, if an IEA member is determined in 
violation of the treaty, the country forfeits all or a fraction of their deposit. If deposit 
amounts are set to exceed the expected cost of compliance for signatories, the system 
is expected to motivate full compliance by its members. The deposit-refund system 
does not require strong sanctioning institutions in the sense that it is not necessary to 
extract financial resources from a non-compliant country ex post (e.g., through fines or 
taxation). Rather, the neutral institution simply has to withhold the initial deposit. 
 
In our setting, the deposit-refund system is similar to performance bonds that are levied 
to ensure fulfillment of environmental obligations. An example is the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act (1977) which requires firms to purchase bonds before 
attaining the permits to begin a mining project. The bond amounts are refunded if the 
mined land is adequately reclaimed. Performance bonds are also used in the 
management of timber, oil and gas industries. While deposit-refunds/performance 
bonds, to our knowledge, have not been included as compliance provisions in 
environmental agreements, the fact that similar systems are used in other 
environmental policy dimensions suggests that such mechanisms may be effective. 
 
Although a deposit-refund system has not yet been implemented within an IEA, the 
mechanism has received some recent attention. The idea was initially mentioned briefly 
by Finus (2008) in a paper on credible enforcement with IEAs. Shortly after, Gerber and 
Wichardt (2009) developed a general theoretical model in the public economics 
literature, finding that under certain conditions a deposit-refund can motivate efficient 
public-good provision. More recently, Hovi et al. (2012) discuss broadly how such a 
mechanism can be used to maintain compliance with a climate agreement, and Cherry 
and McEvoy (2013) designed a series of experiments to test the predictions from 
Gerber and Wichardt. We add to this particular segment of the literature in two 
fundamental ways. First, we analyze the properties of the deposit-refund mechanism 
within a well-established model of international environmental agreement formation 
among heterogeneous countries. Second, we relax some of the more restrictive 
assumptions of the standard model and consider the effects of imperfect monitoring, 
partial participation, uncertainty and reputation on the effectiveness of the enforcement 
mechanism. 
 
2 The problem of enforcing compliance with IEAs 
 
Compliance with international environmental agreements must be enforced. Although in 
some cases compliance may be achieved through informal enforcement mechanisms, 
in practice, provisions for enforcing compliance are included in many IEAs.5 The 
problem is that with many treaties these provisions cannot sufficiently deter non-
compliance. For example, consider the limitations of the enforcement mechanism 
implemented under the Kyoto protocol. The enforcement provisions were adopted in 
Marrakesh during the seventh conference of the parties in 2001. Specifically, the 
provision states that if a country is deemed non-compliant after the first commitment 
period of the Protocol (2008–2012), then they are required to abate the difference 
between their observed emissions and their assigned emissions plus an additional 30 % 
of the deficit during the second commitment period. This penalty (emissions reduction) 
is in addition to its defined commitments during the next period. In other words, the 
penalty imposed for falling short of their emissions target is to increase the amount of 
abatement a signatory is responsible for during the next commitment period. It is hard to 
conceive of a more ineffective punishment strategy. Since countries can put off 
abatement activities indefinitely, under Kyoto’s enforcement provision signatories have 
incentives to be non-compliant indefinitely. Moreover, non-compliant signatories can opt 
out of subsequent commitment periods to the Kyoto Protocol, thus avoiding the 
sanction.6 In fact, many attribute the impending failure of the Kyoto Protocol to the lack 
of credible enforcement of compliance. Barrett (2003, p.360) argues, ‘‘…if the 
negotiators had reflected on the need for enforcement and on the difficulty of devising 
an effective enforcement mechanism earlier in the process, they may have negotiated a 
different kind of treaty—one that sustained more cooperation.’’ 
 
One of the most storied IEAs at the global scale is the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer (or simply the Montreal Protocol). It entered into force in 
1989 and is considered by many as one of the most impressive examples of large-scale 
international cooperation. The treaty required developed nations (Annex A countries) to 
immediately begin eliminating the use and sale of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other 
ozone-depleting substances and required developing nations to begin a slow phase-out 
of these substances. The provision for enforcing compliance with the Montreal Protocol 
is much different than that of the Kyoto Protocol. The parties to the treaty, at their fourth 
meeting, decided upon a list of measures that may be taken in response to non- 
compliance with the Protocol. These included ‘‘carrots’’ in the form of technological and 
financial assistance as well as ‘‘sticks’’ in the form of trade sanctions and suspension of 
other rights under the Protocol. How much of the apparent success of the Montreal 
Protocol can be attributed to its enforcement mechanism, however, is unclear without 
counterfactual evidence on compliance levels in the absence of the provision (Benedick 
1998). 
 
The threat of trade sanctions to enforce compliance is employed in other IEAs, notably 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). Although it 
appears that trade sanctions have been used successfully to enforce compliance (and 
participation) with IEAs, such sanctions may not be conducive to every agreement. The 
credibility of trade sanctions is questionable since they require signatories to unilaterally 
impose restrictions as they see fit. Thus, the type and severity of the punishment will 
vary between member countries (Barrett 2008). Indeed, it is possible that a second-
order freeriding problem exists with trade restrictions as some countries may rely on 
others to bear the cost of imposing sanctions. 
 
Agreements may also rely on more informal enforcement strategies (Keohane 1986). 
For example, nations employing a strategy of ‘‘conditional cooperation’’ will comply with 
their commitments only if other parties do the same. However, for the most part 
enforcement provisions included in IEAs are either not severe enough to deter non- 
compliance (e.g., the provision under the Kyoto Protocol) or the sanctions are not 
credible in the sense that they are unlikely to be imposed. Chayes and Chayes (1995, p. 
33) bear this narrative out by arguing that the fundamental problem with sanctions 
included as part of existing IEAs is that employing them ‘‘entails high costs to the 
sanctioner.’’ In other words, trade sanctions and other reciprocal strategies require that 
the parties themselves incur the cost of sanctioning, and therefore, the sanctions are 
not credible. On the other hand, the enforcement mechanism under Kyoto can only be 
effective given a strong regulatory body that can mandate emissions control policies. 
Sovereignty, of course, precludes this possibility, and thus, the need to explore 
alternative enforcement strategies. 
 
Here, we examine a deposit-refund to enforce compliance with an IEA. The mechanism 
is credible in the sense that it does not rely on signatories to voluntarily impose costly 
sanctions, and it does not rely on an enforcement body to extract financial resources 
from a non-compliant country ex post. This study adds to the previous analytical 
literature on enforcing compliance with IEAs (e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Folmer 
et al. 1993; Barrett 1994, 1997, 2008; Carraro and Botteon 1997; Carraro and 
Siniscalco 1997; Hoel and Schneider 1997; Botteon and Carraro 1998; Finus and 
Rundshagen 1998; Barrett and Stavins 2003; Hovi et al. 2007; Finus 2008; McEvoy and 
Stranlund 2009).8 In the next section, we develop a simple model of international 
emissions abatement in order to demonstrate how a deposit-refund system functions 
within an IEA. We present the results of the model, and then, in the section that follows, 
consider the effects of imperfect monitoring, uncertainty, partial participation and 
reputation on the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism. 
 
3 A model of an IEA with heterogeneous countries 
 
To analyze how a deposit refund is incorporated within an IEA, we adopt with the well-
known model from Barrett (1994) and McGinty (2007) from the non-cooperative game  
 
Fig. 1 Country i’s marginal benefit and cost of emissions abatement     ^^^^^ 
 
theory literature. We choose this model because it clearly illustrates the inherent free-
rider problem within international agreements by structuring the relationship between 
countries as a prisoners’ dilemma. Let N = {1, …, n} denote the set of asymmetric 
countries. Following Barrett (1994) and McGinty (2007) global benefit from emissions 
abatement is assumed to be a concave function B(Q) = b(aQ – Q^2/2) that depends on 
the worldwide quantity of emissions abatement qi; where qi is country i’s 
abatement level.9 Parameters a and b are positive. Country i receives benefit share 
where and = 1. Therefore, the total benefit of abatement for country i 
is Bi(Q, ai) = aib(aQ – Q^2/2) and the marginal benefit of abatement is 
 
(1)     
where Q-i denotes the aggregate abatement level of the other N - 1 countries. 
Abatement cost functions are assumed to be convex for all countries and take the form 
Ci(qi, ci) = ciqi^2/2. Thus, the marginal abatement cost (MAC) for country i is 
 
(2)       
 
In a non-cooperative game, country i chooses qi by equating (1) and (2) which yields 
 
(3)     
 
where the superscript R denotes a country’s reaction function. A country’s reaction 
function is increasing in the size and share of the benefit of abatement and decreasing 
in the individual cost of abatement and the level of abatement provided by the (N - 1) 
other countries. The joint solution to the N countries’ reaction functions yields the non-
cooperative equilibrium abatement level for country i, which we denote as . Figure 1 
illustrates Eqs. (1) and (2) and for country i. The figure is drawn by fixing aggregate 
abatement of the other N - 1 countries at their equilibrium non-cooperative level, 
denoted as  
 
Because abatement by one nation results in a positive externality that benefits the other 
N - 1 nations, maximizing social welfare requires that the abatement externality is 
internalized. The welfare-maximizing level of abatement is the result of joint 
maximization of each individual country’s net benefit function. The welfare-maximizing 
level, which we denote as qi*, is derived formally in McGinty (2007). The important 
relationship is that , and thus, maximizing social welfare requires 
more abatement than the non-cooperative outcome. Thus, it is possible that countries 
can improve joint welfare by increasing emissions abatement through an international 
environmental agreement. 
 
3.1 An IEA with a deposit-refund system 
 
Consider an international environmental agreement that forms over two stages. In the 
first stage (the participation stage), countries decide whether to ratify and become 
signatories to the agreement. When making the decision to ratify, each country faces a 
defined emission abatement commitment of . Therefore, the 
emissions abatement requirement for country i under the IEA is strictly greater than the 
unilateral management level. When making the decision to ratify, countries also face a 
minimum participation requirement, denoted as sp, that specifies the minimum number 
of countries required for entry into force.11,12 Following Gerber and Wichardt (2009), 
we consider the case in which entry into force requires the grand coalition, that is, sp = 
N.13 Throughout, _qi and sp are chosen so that IEAs are profitable for the members. 
Profitability requires that if at least sp countries ratify the IEA, and each member country 
abates its required amount of emissions, then a member earns more under the IEA 
compared to the non-cooperative outcome. 
 
As part of the ratification process, each country is required to pay a deposit of amount di 
to a neutral third-party institution. If the agreement does not receive enough signatories 
to satisfy the minimum membership requirement, then the deposit amounts are 
immediately returned and an IEA does not form. Otherwise, if enough countries ratify 
(and pay deposits) to satisfy the minimum membership requirement, then the IEA enters 
into force and the members are bound to their commitments. In stage two (the 
compliance stage), member countries make their emissions abatement decisions. At the 
end of the compliance stage, a member country’s abatement activities are monitored 
and their compliance level is determined. If qi __qi, then a country is deemed compliant 
and is refunded the total amount di. Otherwise, if qi __qi, then a country is in violation of 
its agreement and will forfeit all or a portion of its deposit (described in more detail 
below). We start with an analysis of the compliance stage. 
 
If nations reach the compliance stage, then an agreement of size sp has formed and 
each member country has paid their deposit. In this stage, the members must make 
their emissions abatement decision. Whether a country chooses to comply with the 
agreement depends on the relative costs and benefits of compliance. Because qnc 
i \_qi compliance requires abatement beyond the individually welfare-maximizing level, 
and thus, compliance is necessarily costly. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the cost of complying with an IEA increases as the abatement 
activities of the other N - 1 countries increase. To see this, consider how country i’s 
marginal benefit function changes with increases in other countries’ abatement levels. 
Figure 2 illustrates a change in the marginal benefit function when Q-i is fixed at the 
non-cooperative equilibrium level compared to when it is fixed at the level of abatement 
when all other members are fully compliant with their commitments under an IEA, . 
Since  the marginal benefit function of country i shifts downward given any 
positive level of compliance (i.e., abatement beyond the non-cooperative level) by the 
other members. This causes i’s optimal level of emissions abatement to decrease under 
an IEA relative to . 
 
This relationship is clear from country i’s reaction function in Eq. (3) which decreases 
with increases in abatement from other countries. Therefore, the appropriate baseline 
level of emissions to use when estimating the cost of compliance with an IEA is not the 
unilateral management abatement level, but rather an abatement level strictly less than 
that and bounded below by the level realized if all other countries comply with their 
agreements (denoted as qi B). In Fig. 2, the cost of compliance with an IEA is bounded 
from below by b (if no other country abates beyond the non-cooperative level) and from 
above by a + b + c (if all other countries fully comply). 
 
We can derive the expression for a country’s marginal compliance cost by subtracting 
its marginal benefit of abatement from its marginal abatement cost: 
(4)      
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Country i’s cost of compliance under an IEA      
 
From (4), the marginal cost of compliance is decreasing in the overall benefit to 
abatement and its share of the benefit and is increasing in the cost of abatement and 
the cumulative level of global abatement. 
 
A member’s total cost of compliance with an IEA that achieves full compliance is 
 
(5)     
 
which corresponds to area a ? b ? c in Fig. 2. A member will comply with the IEA if and 
only if the benefits from compliance exceed the cost of compliance. Under the deposit-
refund system, the benefit from compliance is the return of the deposited amount. 
Therefore, to achieve full compliance, deposits must be set so that di C CCi. 
If, after country i’s emissions abatement decision, qi __qi, then a firm is deemed 
compliant and is refunded the total amount di.15 Otherwise, if qi\_qi, then a country is in 
violation of its agreement and will forfeit its deposit. Clearly if di C CCi, then i will fully 
comply with their commitments. However, in practice, the treaty must also specify 
whether a non-compliant country loses all or only a portion of their deposit. Losing the 
entire deposit in response to any level of non-compliance is incentive compatible, but 
perhaps extreme. This could be resolved by a system in which deposit amounts are 
returned in proportion to the member country’s level of compliance. Formally, for an 
abatement choice of qi < qi, a member country will be refunded an amount weakly 
greater than . The key element being that the amount a 
member country is refunded must be weakly greater than their respective cost of 
compliance. Since ci and qi will likely differ across the N countries, incentive compatible 
deposit amounts will also differ. 
 
Given that deposits paid in the participation stage are incentive compatible, members 
are expected to fully comply with their commitments in the compliance stage. In the 
participation stage, countries decide simultaneously whether to join the IEA. Although 
emissions abatement commitments and required deposit amounts differ across 
countries, given that the vector of deposit amounts satisfies di > CCi for all i, all 
countries are expected to comply in stage two. Since _q and sp are chosen so that IEAs 
are profitable, and since participation from all countries is required for entry into force, 
all countries are expected to join in the participation stage and fully comply with the 
agreement in the compliance stage. Therefore, a well-crafted deposit-refund system can 
motivate a desired level of participation and full compliance with an international 
agreement on the environment. 
 
4 A critical discussion of the deposit-refund system 
 
The simple static model presented in section three is useful for demonstrating how a 
deposit-refund system functions and how optimal deposit amounts are determined. The 
model, necessarily, abstracts away from important practical concerns of implementing a 
deposit-refund system. In this section, we discuss some of those concerns. 
 
4.1 Deposits 
 
The deposit-refund system requires the existence of a third-party institution capable of 
holding and disbursing financial deposits. Although the deposit-refund feature is unique 
to IEAs, the creation of third-party financial institutions to support international 
cooperation is not novel. For example, the Multilateral Fund was created under the 
Montreal Protocol to facilitate financial exchange between developed and developing 
countries. The fund facilitates compliance by aiding developing countries with the cost 
of reducing their dependency on ozone-depleting substances. The financial institution 
under a deposit-refund system would work entirely different. The institution would 
manage escrow accounts in which monies will be disbursed given the fulfillment of 
contractual emissions abatement responsibilities. Ratification of the IEA would serve as 
a binding contract to the escrow. It would be expected that deposit holdings collect 
interest from a risk-free investment that has a life span equivalent to the timing of 
commitment periods. Unlike our static model from section three, IEAs are likely to have 
commitment periods that span many years. For example, the first commitment period 
under the Kyoto Protocol lasts from 2008 to the end of 2012. While it is possible to 
require a lump-sum deposit sufficient to cover the entire cost of compliance over a 
commitment period, it is perhaps more reasonable to require incremental deposits. For 
example, if di > CCi is satisfied with a deposit amount of 200 billion U.S. Dollars, a 
country could make five annual deposits of 40 billion (assuming, for simplicity, a 
discount rate of zero) for compliance to be incentive compatible. Provided that existing 
deposited amounts are lost if additional deposits are not made, the mechanism holds its 
desirable properties. Incremental deposits are also more flexible in the sense that 
annual deposit amounts may be adjusted given changes in compliance cost estimates. 
 
The actual size of the deposit, of course, depends on the member country’s abatement 
responsibilities and its corresponding cost of compliance. That said, to provide a rough 
idea of the size of these deposits, we consider estimates of compliance costs for the 
United States under the Kyoto Protocol. According to a report by the Energy Information 
Administration (1998), the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis Model developed 
by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology estimates that the cost for 
the United States to comply with the Kyoto Protocol (a 7 % reduction in 1990 level 
emissions) ranges from 0.5 to 1.5 % of GDP in 2010. The report estimates this 
percentage loss, using 1996 dollars, to be between $52 billion and $156 billion in 2010. 
Thus, if using the upper-bound estimate from this example study, the United States 
would require a deposit greater than $156 billion to motivate full compliance with Kyoto. 
However, given such a broad range of compliance costs in this single study, it is clear 
that uncertainty will play a nontrivial role in determining optimal deposits and whether 
the deposit-refund system holds its desirable properties (we explore uncertainly later in 
this section). The report also includes compliance cost estimates for the United States 
from five other studies. Estimates range from $52 billion to $437 billion (4.2 % of 2010 
GDP). These estimates were made without accounting for the possibility of emissions 
trading, sinks, offsets or the Clean Development Mechanism, and therefore, the 
estimates likely overestimate abatement costs with Kyoto. 
 
In theory, an optimal deposit-refund system motivates full compliance by the parties to 
the IEA, and therefore obviates the need to address the question of what to do with 
withheld deposits. In reality, the practical question of what to do with a positive deposit 
balance must be addressed. In terms of maintaining incentive compatible deposits, the 
most important concern is that the deposit amounts are not disbursed in a way that 
distorts the marginal incentives to comply with the agreement. A simple way to achieve 
this is to use the remaining deposits to fund the provision of other global public goods 
that are not directly tied to the resource managed under the IEA. 
 
4.2 Monitoring for compliance 
 
Thus far the analysis has assumed that an IEA member country’s emissions level (and 
therefore compliance level) can be monitored completely and accurately. This of course 
is an oversimplification. Monitoring global emissions, of any kind, is necessarily prone to 
inaccuracies. In most cases, members’ compliance levels with IEAs are determined 
through self-reports. For example, monitoring of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol is 
the responsibility of the Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee established 
under the Marrakesh Accords. Annex I Parties to Kyoto are required to submit annual 
greenhouse gas inventories to the Enforcement Branch for review. The committee 
audits the reports and makes a conclusion as to whether the reporting country is in 
compliance. Clearly, in the absence of sanctions in response to violating a treaty, 
parties have incentives to break their commitments and falsely report that they are in 
compliance. In contrast, under a deposit-refund system the sanction is well defined; that 
is, a non-compliant member forfeits their deposit amount (or an amount proportional to 
their level of non-compliance). However, because monitoring for compliance will likely 
be, in some degree, incomplete or inaccurate, a country is likely to weigh their expected 
sanction imposed in response to noncompliance (i.e., the probability of being found non-
compliant times the deposit) with the benefit of non-compliance (i.e., the savings in 
abatement costs). Both Type I and Type II errors are possibilities given the realities of 
inaccurate monitoring. A Type I error results when a monitoring body falsely concludes 
that a non-compliant party is under compliance. On the other hand, a Type II error 
describes a situation in which a compliant country is falsely determined non-compliant. 
Most IEAs include provisions to limit the extent of Type II errors, so they are likely to 
play only a minor role.16 It is more likely that the positive probability of a Type I error 
influences the compliance decision of a member country. When Type I errors are 
possible, the benefit from non-compliance increases relative to when monitoring is 
perfectly accurate. Therefore, incentive compatible deposit amounts will need to be 
higher given Type I monitoring errors in comparison with the baseline case that 
assumes complete and accurate monitoring. 
 
4.3 Uncertainty in the benefit-cost ratio 
 
An additional challenge with implementing a deposit-refund system within an IEA is that 
the deposits are paid upon ratification but compliance decisions are made in the future. 
In that time, it is possible that the costs and benefits of compliance change, and, as a 
result, deposits that were incentive compatible at ratification may be insufficient at the 
time of compliance. This is problematic in particular if the cost of compliance emerges to 
be significantly higher than expected because signatories may then find it profitable to 
violate the terms of the agreement and forfeit their deposits. 
 
To illustrate, denote the benefit-cost ratio for country i as ci = b/ci. The marginal 
compliance cost from Eq. (4), following Kolstad (2007), can now be expressed as  
 
(4a)     
 
From (4a) it is clear that the marginal cost of compliance is decreasing in the benefit-
cost ratio. Let us now assume that there are two states of the world, one with a high 
benefit-cost ratio  and one with a low benefit-cost ratio , which occur with the 
following probabilities, p and 1 – p, respectively. When making the decision to join an 
IEA, a country is informed about the two potential states of the world and their 
respective likelihoods. However, which state of the world will transpire is not revealed 
until the compliance stage. To make clear comparisons between this model and the one 
without uncertainty from section three, assume that  and the 
deposit amount di is determined by the expected value (i.e., ci). Therefore, when 
making the decision to join an IEA and pay the deposit in the participation stage, a risk-
neutral country faces the same incentives as in the model without uncertainty. 
 
Once in the compliance stage, the total cost of compliance is 
 
(5a)     
 
where j = H, L depending on the realized state of the world. Nations will comply with the 
treaty only if the deposit amount is weakly greater than the total cost of compliance. 
Clearly, if the benefit-cost ratio is high, then the deposit amount will be more than 
sufficient to motivate full compliance. In this case, this type of uncertainty does not pose 
a problem. However, if the benefit-cost ratio is sufficiently low, the deposit will not be 
large enough to motivate compliance with the IEA. The result will be realized abatement 
levels less than the committed levels under the treaty. With asymmetric countries and 
compliance costs that depend on aggregate abatement, the total level of emissions 
abatement achieved under uncertainty will also depend on the expectations of the 
benefit-cost ratios of the other signatories. 
 
It is not clear, however, whether the possibility of higher-than-expected compliance 
costs renders the deposit-refund system less desirable. First, if the cost of compliance 
increases because of a jump in the cost of emissions abatement, the welfare 
maximizing level of abatement will decrease in response. Without conjecturing whether 
it is likely, it is nevertheless possible that less abatement is actually desirable. Second, 
deposits that are too low to encourage compliance with an IEA may be likened to 
‘‘safety-valves’’ that are included in many emissions permit markets. In these systems, if 
the permit market equilibrium price is exceptionally high due to unexpectedly high 
marginal abatement costs, firms may purchase additional permits from a regulator at a 
lower fixed price. In a similar spirit, with the deposit-refund system if the cost of abating 
emissions is unexpectedly high, nations can avoid paying that cost by reducing 
abatement and forfeiting their deposit. 
 
4.4 Reputation 
 
Although not addressed in the model from section three, it is possible that nations may 
suffer non-pecuniary sanctions from violating an international treaty. For example, 
meaningful participation with an IEA signals a willingness to cooperate internationally 
and demonstrates adherence to a cooperative norm. Through compliance, a 
participating country may build a positive reputation as a cooperative member of a 
global community. A positive reputation may improve a country’s negotiating position in 
other political dimensions. The flip side of this is that non-compliance with commitments 
made under an IEA may cause a country’s reputation as a cooperating member to 
deteriorate, and this reputation loss may be costly. 
 
Positive reputation effects will effectively increase the benefit of abating emissions. To 
illustrate, Fig. 3 displays a candidate for a country’s marginal benefit of abatement with 
reputation effects (dashed line). The solid line is the now familiar marginal benefit of 
abatement without reputation effects. Note that, like Fig. 2, the aggregate abatement 
level of the other N - 1 countries is fixed at the full cooperative level under the IEA. In 
the graph, if a country fully complies with the IEA, it receives the full benefit of a positive 
reputation (denoted as r). The total cost of compliance given a positive reputation effect 
is a, whereas the total cost of compliance without a reputation effect is a + b. 
 
Abatement beyond the required amount does not enhance the reputation effect above r. 
On the other hand, if a country becomes in violation of the agreement (i.e., abates less 
than ) its reputation effect diminishes until it becomes zero at the baseline level of 
emissions. 
 
Quantifying the value of a positive reputation as a cooperative member of a global 
community is likely not achievable. That said, a positive reputation effect may be 
capable of offsetting small shifts in benefit/cost functions that could result from shifts in 
supply and/or demand or from uncertainty. Recall, if the marginal cost of emissions 
abatement is revealed to be higher than was estimated when determining the deposit 
amount, then the required deposit will be too low to motivate full compliance. In this 
case, the reputation effect may act as a buffer by increasing the marginal benefit of 
abatement, perhaps enough to bring a member country under compliance. In short, 
acknowledging a reputation effect may quell some concerns that deposits will be set too 
low due to incomplete information during the negotiation stage. 
 
4.5 Partial participation 
 
While some IEAs do require the grand coalition to join before entry into force (e.g., 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic), 
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many require only partial participation (e.g., Kyoto and Montreal Protocols). Requiring 
less than full participation means that members and non-members can coexist. 
Regardless of whether an IEA requires full or partial participation, an agreement that 
enters into force will require its members to take on more emissions abatement than 
realized in the non-cooperative case (maintaining the condition that _q and sp are 
chosen so that IEAs are profitable). Non-members, of course, are not required to take 
on abatement activities. In fact, from the reaction function in Eq. (3), non-members will 
respond to an increase in abatement from IEA members by reducing their own 
abatement. As members increase abatement above the non-cooperative level, non-
members reduce abatement below their non-cooperative levels, and therefore, the 
downward shift in the marginal benefit of abatement caused by an IEA (dashed line in 
Fig. 2) will be less dramatic when only a subset of countries are required to join. From 
Fig. 2, this will cause the total cost of compliance with an IEA given partial participation 
to be weakly less than the cost of compliance given full participation (provided the same 
level of ). 
 
The existence of free-riding non-members, however, should not preclude effective IEAs 
from forming. Again, if agreements are profitable for the members, and deposit amounts 
are chosen so that compliance is incentive compatible, then there is an incentive for an 
IEA of sp members to form. Non-members will fare better than members because they 
enjoy the benefits of increased emissions abatement without incurring the cost. It is 
possible that the payoff differences between members and non-members could prevent 
IEAs from forming due to coordination failures. That is, an agreement may fail to form 
because countries have competing incentives when making participation decisions: on 
one hand, every country prefers that an IEA forms, and on the other, every country 
prefers to free ride on that agreement. 
 
It is also possible that equity concerns may exacerbate the difficulties in forming 
effective IEAs when only a subset of countries are required for entry into force. Again, 
non-members enjoy the benefit of increased public-good provision without paying the 
cost. If countries have preferences toward inequitable responsibilities and payoffs, those 
preferences may prevent otherwise profitable IEAs from forming. Indeed, Kosfeld et al. 
(2009) demonstrate that inequality aversion can increase the minimum profitable 
agreement size. This means that minimum participation requirements must be set 
higher to ensure profitability when countries have preferences toward inequality. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Whether nations are able to cooperatively manage shared resources through 
international environmental agreements depends largely on whether members can 
credibly enforce compliance with their commitments. In the absence of an overarching 
regulator capable of mandating policies and imposing financial sanctions in response to 
non-compliance, nations must rely on alternative enforcement mechanisms. In this 
paper, we critique one promising mechanism—a deposit-refund system—which does 
not require the presence of a strong sanctioning institution. The mechanism works as 
follows: Upon ratification, member countries pay a pre-defined deposit to a third-party 
financial institution. If enough countries ratify the IEA to satisfy a minimum participation 
requirement, then the agreement enters into force. In that case deposits are returned 
(with interest) if members are deemed in compliance at the end of the commitment 
period. If a member country is found non-compliant, then all or a portion of their deposit 
is withheld. If an IEA does not receive enough signatories to enter into force, then all 
collected deposits are refunded immediately and an effective agreement does not form. 
The deposit-refund system motivates participation and compliance with an IEA provided 
that agreements are profitable and that the deposited amount is greater than the 
realized cost of compliance. 
 
The deposit-refund system does not require strong sanctioning institutions in the sense 
that it is not necessary to extract financial resources from a non-compliant country after 
emissions decisions are made (e.g., through fines or taxation). Rather, the neutral 
institution simply withholds the initial deposit in response to non-compliance. In most 
cases, it is unrealistic to expect a non-compliant country to pay a financial penalty ex 
post since they can simply withdraw from an agreement. The deposit-refund system 
circumvents this issue because the deposits are paid before emissions decisions are 
made. Therefore, leaving the agreement is likely an undesirable response to detected 
non-compliance because exit triggers the loss of the deposit. 
 
Moreover, the deposit-refund mechanism does not require that the IEA members 
themselves pay the cost of enforcing compliance. For example, the threat of trade 
sanctions in response to non-participation and/or non-compliance requires that IEA 
members (including compliant countries) restrict trade with violating countries (e.g., 
Montreal Protocol). Restricting trade is costly for the parties punished, but it is also 
costly for the punisher. Chayes and Chayes (1995) argue that the fundamental problem 
with sanctions included in many IEAs is that those imposing them pay a high cost, and 
as a result, the sanctions are not likely to be implemented. The deposit-refund 
mechanism avoids this issue altogether.  
 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on enforcing compliance by developing 
an analytical model of an IEA with heterogeneous countries under a deposit-refund 
system. Our paper also addresses the practical issues of incomplete and inaccurate 
monitoring for compliance with IEAs, uncertainty and the size of required deposits, the 
effect of reputation on compliance costs and equity concerns on the effectiveness of a 
deposit-refund system. The mechanism is certainly not flawless. It requires countries to 
pay substantial sums of money at the front end of an international agreement (possibly 
larger than 2 % of GDP) while facing great uncertainty. It also relies on a financial 
institution capable of holding deposits and issuing reimbursements. It should be 
acknowledged that the creation of a neutral institution with the power to withhold 
financial deposits from non-compliant parties constitutes an exercise of international 
governance that is remarkably rare in IEAs. However, a carefully designed deposit-
refund system is credible, effective and simple to understand. For these reasons, it 
should be considered seriously as a potential mechanism to enforce compliance with 
international agreements on the environment. 
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